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- 1. The Yugoslav State Railways are using Yugoslav coal of low quality exclusively. Even locomotives acquired abroad before and after World War II are fitted with special boilers which permit the use of Yugoslav coal: that is, fossil coal of up to only 6,000 calories, brown coal of up to 4,500 calories and lignite of up to 3,500 calories.
- 2. The principal mines furnishing the Yugoslav State Railways with coal are Siveric, Kakanj, Breza, Araja, and Trbovlje.
- 3. Reserves and daily consumption of coal (in tons) by the Yugoslav State Railways as of 31 December 1951 are as follows:

## Reserves

Fossil coal	Brown coal	Lignite	Total
6,998	9,188	7,152	23,338
	Daily consumption	•	
1,417	6,030	1,703	9,150
	These reserves therefore lasted:		

5 days 1.2 days 4.2 days

4. To guarantee a normal continuation of service there should, however, be coal reserves in stock representing a normal twenty-day consumption. If this were to be achieved, the actual reserves as given above would have had to be increased by a very considerable amount.

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- 5. It may thus be seen that there was an important, if not critical, coal deficit at the end of last year. This was brought about during the third quarter of the year when the mines were suddenly unable to furnish enough coal to the railways owing to a lack of available manpower. There were also some other but less important reasons. During the third quarter of 1951 the mines furnished the railways with 220,000 tons less than foreseen and contracted for. The railways could not, therefore, continue to maintain their normal services: half of the passenger trains had to be suspended, and some 3,000 freight trucks were laid up, with the corresponding number of locomotives as well. The greatest difficulties were experienced in the mines of Arsja and Ibar.
- 6. The authorities knew by the beginning of October 1951 that the cuts in supplies would produce a serious crisis for the railways and certain other industries dependent on the coal supplied by these mines. The following drastic measures were adopted:
  - a. Following a decision by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugo-slavia (CPY), organizations of the Party in factories and elsewhere were obliged to supply two or three CPY members for "voluntary" work in the mines for the duration of two months, without the actual profession of the member being taken into account;
  - b. The Ministry of the Interior ordered members of the People's Militia into the mines where and whenever they were available. From Serbia alone 2,000 Militia men were recruited for this work;
  - c. At the same time, powerful propaganda was started in agricultural districts to get peasant labor into the mines during the time when there was little work on the farms; and
  - d. Furthermore, some 8,000 factory workers were sent into the mines from plants which had to slow down production owing to scarcity of coal and other raw materials.

These measures produced good results.

- 7. Even in spite of these measures, the most important coal center, that of Arsja, had only 88 per cent of the necessary manpower at its disposal for full operation of the mine in December 1951. All the above measures are therefore still in force today. Party members and workers from other industries going into the mines get a free return ticket and are guaranteed their full wages according to their status before going into the mines. Sometimes they even receive bonuses.
- 8. It is stressed that the measures taken to combat the crisis were of a very democratic character in comparison with such crises of a few years ago. Except for the CPY members and the Militia, none of the other categories asked to go into the mines were ever forced to do so. A few years ago the authorities simply called up large sections of the population and forced them to work in the mines; especially peasants who refused to become members of the cooperatives. However, a repetition of such a coal crisis during an emergency, as in case of a general mobilization or war, might have disastrous consequences for the country.

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